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1. Introduction
The political changes which took place in the late 1980s in Eastern Europe cleared the
way for the radical reforms of the economies of these countries, taking them from a com-
mand (planned) to the market system. Although the general strategy of such a transition
is clear, there are many distinctive ways to apply the general strategy. The choice varies
from country to country and from one segment of the economy to an other. A crucial pre-
requisite for making the correct choice of a particular strategy is knowledge of the current
(previous) nonmarket system, its features and how it worked. An appropriate diagnosis
of the current (previous) system and its effects can be solid ground for the formulation
of a sound transition strategy. Therefore, considerable effort has been put into an analysis
of the nonmarket economic system and its various segments.
Nonetheless, one of the segments of the economic system which has not been widely
studied until now is urban land use system in Eastern Europe. Hence, the intention of this
paper .is to examine the crucial features of the nonmarket urban land use system and to
analyze its effects on urban development. This will be done using the case of Belgrade
as a representative Eastern European city. Accordingly, the institutional framework and
the crucial features of the current (nonmarket) urban land use system will be analyzed.
Its economic and financial effects as well as its impact on urban development will be sur-
veyed and evaluated. Such a procedure will hopefully provide a solid basis from which
to consider the reform of the nonmarket urban land use system in Eastern European cities.
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2. The institutional framework of the nonmarket urban land use system
¡
The economic system which existed in Yugoslaviabefore the 1991 civil war was similar
to the Soviet economic system. The crucial features of such a socialist system were:
a) the monopoly of public ownership of virtually all assets and wealth;
b) a nonexisting market; Le. no market allocation of either production factors or goods;
e) administrative (command) allocation of both production factors and goods.
At the core of Yugoslav economic system was public ownership, called «social owner-
ship» according to Yugoslav legal terminology. Social (public) ownership dominated the
major industries (the manufacturing industry, transportation, commerce, banking, insu-
rance, etc.) as well as national wealth (urban land, etc.). There were just a few cases whe-
re this monopoly did not apply, so private ownership was allowed onIy in agriculture (agri-
culturalland up to 10 ha) and in the small trade and technical services sector (firms with
up to five employees).
Nonetheless, the Yugoslav economic system (also known as socialist selfmanagement)
had several distinctive features setting it apart from the Soviet system.' The first feature
was the social ownership system which, contrary to the Soviet state ownership system, was
characterized by the absence of a recognized property owner and well defined property
rights. Hence, socially owned assets or wealth did not belong to anyone specific (either
to the State or to the employees), but belong to society. This rather nebulous concept has
eliminated a recognized owner (with related property rights) of the vast majority of assets
and wealth. The concept of social ownership was developed in compliance with the idea
that property rights are not important for economic performance (efficiency), but onIy for
the distribution of retums (earnings). The basic idea of the architects of the system (Kar-
delj (1971)) was to abolish every type of proper ownership, thereby abolishing
all revenues based on ownership (non-labor revenues).2
The second distinction was that the market was not replaced by a central plan body but,
in the last twenty years at least, by the concept of «social bargaining», whereby allocation
resulted from a system, in which the numerous parties concerned would negotiate and set-
tle all important economic issues (supply, prices, wages, etc.) through relevant institutio-
nal mechanisms.
The architects of the system considered that social bargaining would lead to the settle-
ment of all conflicts based on partial interests.
Since there was no production factor market allocation, there was no labor or capital
market (stock exchange), no securities (capital was immobile), employed labor could not
be fired (lose their jobs) , wages were determined exogenously, and interest rates (which
were fixed by the state) were the same at all banks and always lower than inflation (hence
there were no earnings from capital).
Contrary to the Soviet system, there was a goods market in ex-Yugoslavia, although it
was not quite similar to the goods markets in Western countries. It was carteled and pro-
tected from foreign competition andmarket information was not crucial for decision ma-
king in firms.
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Although there is controversy as to whether such a system provided dynamic growth
in its early phase,? there is consensus that the system as such did not provide economic
efficiency: there was no way for the efficient allocation of resources. Maximizing wages
was the goal of the self-management firms, so such firms characterized a distortional reac-
tion to the changing conditions on the market. Furthermore, the benevolent socialist go-
vernment made the budget constraint of self-managed firms very soft by means of a gene-
rous credit and subsidy policy. The result wasapathy, mismanagement, inefficiency, inflation,
unemployment, zero growth and big structural debalances.
The features of the general economic system determined the institutions and mechanisms
of the urban land use system: the monopoly of public ownership and the lack of a market
allocation of resources.
3. Tbe features and mechanisms of the nonmarket urban land use system
There is a monopoly of public urban landownership, known in Belgrade as «social lan-
downership», The actuallandowner is the municipal (city) authority. This monopoly was
established by the nationalization of urban land which was completed in 1958. 4 As there
is a monopoly of public urban landownership there can be no trading and other related
transactions conceming urban land.
Since the urban land trade is not feasible, the necessary condition for the existence of
an urban land market is missing. Hence, there are no market transactions, no market land
price, or market rento The nonexistence of an urban land market implies there is no mar-
ket allocation of urban land, but only administrative allocation.
Since there is a monopoly of public urban landownership, privately owned agricultural
land on the urban fringe is transformed into publicly owned urban land by compulsory
purchase. This compulsory purchase is applied in all cases, regardless of future (planned)
land use. A compensation is paid to the previous owner and the level of this compensation
is arbitrarily (unilaterally) determinedby the municipal authority. It has nothing to do with
the market value (price) of a given plot ofland (the compensation for a sq.met. ofpurcha-
sed land equals 0,5% of the average price of a sq.met. social housing floor space). As
the city grows, all plots of land on the urban fringe are transferred to public landownership.
The essence of the administrative allocation is to donate urban land to developers and/or
users. The plot of urban land is still publicly owned, but the developer and/or user is given
the right to develop this plot and to retain the building in his ownership. This regulation
is somewhat similar to the institution of land leasehold in market economies, with the ex-
ception of two points: a) unlike a leasehold arrangement the urban land donation is not
restricted in time, Le. no expiration date is specified up to which time the plot of land
can be used; b) no market rent is paid by the developer/user. Furthermore, the right to
develop a plot of donated urban land is nontransferable. Hence development has to be ca-
rried out by the selected developer/user.
Urban land donation is based on the discriminatory right of the local authorities to se-
lect potential users according to arbitrarily established criteria. AlI potential users (private
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housing as well as socially owned companies) apply to the municipal authorities for the
urban land donation. The procedure to select a user is not strictly defined, so applications
are evaluated according to arbitrarily established (even ad hoc) criteria.. The municipal
authorities can refuse any application without giving reasons for doing so.
Three fees are paid by the developers/users of the urban land. An urban land donation
fee is paid as a premium to the municipal authority by the developer/user before develop-
ment begins. This fee is calculated according to the blueprint floor space. The amount
of the fee is determined by decision of the municipal authority and this amount is differen-
tiated according to the location and planned land use. The level of the urban land donation
fee can be changed unilaterally by the municipal authority at any time and by any amount,
but nowadays it is usually changed once ayear. The amount of this fee usually comprises
8-10% of the total property investment (development costs).
An urban land servicing fee is also paid as a premium to the municipal authority by
the developer/user before development begins. Urban land servicing includes site clearing
(only in the case of redevelopment) and providing the on-site infrastructure, which inclu-
des connections to the water supply, sewage, power supply and gas supply networks, hea-
ting system and telecornmunications. This fee equals the actual land servicing costs of a
given location, so the average fee (amount of fee per ground sq. met.) varies considerably
from location to location. The amount of this fee usually comprises 35-45 % of the total
investment.
An urban land use fee is paid regularly (monthly) by the user of a given plot of urban
land (location). This fee is calculated according to the floor space. The amount of the fee
is determined by the municipal authority and is differentiated according to the location
and the actual or planned land use. The amount of the urban land use fee can also be chan-
ged unilaterally by the municipal authority's decision at any time and by any amount, but
nowadays it is usually changed quarterly. For many years the levelof the urban land use
fee has been virtually negligible."
AlI the financial resources obtained through the payment of such fees are used to finan-
ce infrastructure investments related to urban development, Le. urban utilities supply (wa-
ter supply and sewage, power and gas supply, the heating system, public transportation
and telecommunications) and to finance the supply ofurban public utilities (roads, streets,
pavements, pathways, parks, etc.). The investments related to urban utilities cannot be fi-
nanced from market revenues since the prices of these utilities have been distorted down-
wards as the result of a policy prescribing that prices should cover operating costs only,
Therefore these investments must be financed externally. On the other hand, the character
of public urban utilities is such that their supply and development must be financed ex-
temally.
4. The economic and financial effects of the nonmarket urban land
use system
The most significant effect of the nonmarket urban land use system is that there are no
market land prices, or market rents. As the existence of competitive market prices is a
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necessary condition for the efficient allocation of urban land as a resource (changing the
partero ofland use from lower to higher value use), the global use ofurban land in Belgra-
de is inefficient. There are two basic inefficiencies: the physical inefficiency of urban land
use and its economic inefficiency. There are also two cases where both types of ineffi-
ciency occur: inefficiency in new development and/or redevelopment and inefficiency in
the use of urban land by the actual occupants (users). An examination of all cases of ineffi-
ciency follows.
Physical inefficiency in the case of new development results from the urban fact that
the land donation fee is an extremely downward distorted surrogate of the urban land pri-
ce. It is reasonable to estimate that the market price would be much higher, particularly
in the city center. A relatively low urban land donation fee is not an incentive for the physical
efficiency of land use, so a relatively low floor-to-ground index and low densities result
from this distortion. Furthermore, the urban land donation fee is calculated according to
the blueprint floor space, not he ground (land) space. Such a method of fee calculation
means that there is no incentive whatsoever for the efficient physical use of urban land
(ground). Hence, the average cost (amount of the fee per floor sq. met.) is constant and
financially it is all the same to the developer/user whether a single flor or a hundred floor
building is constructed on a given location.
Economic inefficiency in the case of new development is a direct consequence of the
absence of a urban land market. If there were a market there would be competition for
a plot of land at a given location, so that the location would be used by the prospective
user who offered the highest bid, Le. the user to whom a given plot of land is the most
valuable. Since efficient allocation requires that resources (urban land in this case) be chan-
neled to their highest value use, a given plot of land would be used efficiently. However,
the actual nonmarket, noncompetitive manner of selecting the users by the local authori-
ties offers no guarantee of economic efficiency in the case of development and or/redeve-
lopment.
Physical inefficiency by the actual occupants is encouraged by the negligible level of
the urban land use fee which they have to payo The actuallocation users do not paya mar-
ket rent which, it is reasonable to expect, would be far higher than the urban land use
fee. Hence this fee is a negligible expenditure for the occupants ..That is why the ineffi-
cient users of space characterized by low densities, such as manufacturing industry plants,
etc., are not encouraged to leave the best and otherwise the most expensive locations, so
they have retained them. Furthermore, the urban land use fee is also calculated according
to floor space, not ground (land) space. Such a method of fee calculation implies that there
is no incentive for the physically efficient use of urban land (ground) because the average
cost (the amount of the fee per sq. met.) is constant regardless of the floor to ground in-
dex. This arrangement is the reason why there are still worthless ground floor buildings
in the very center of Belgrade.
Economic inefficiency by the actual occupants is the consequence of physical inefficiency.
The reason Hes in the fact that physically inefficient users of space, such as the manufactu-
ring industries, the building industry, etc., that have retained their locations are economi-
cally inefficient urban land users. It has been demonstrated that these industries when 10-
cated in big cities are relatively inefficient compared to the same industries located in small
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cities. On the other hand, service industries located in big cities are more efficient compa-
red to those located in small cities." Hence, the restructuring process that leads to increa-
sing the economic efficiency of a city is impeded by the nonmarket urban land use system.
Since the regulations governing the allocation of a site do not include any time limit
for land use, there is no solid basis for the land user's financial calculation, especially
the calculation of net present values. Furthermore, since urban land use fee can be chan-
ged unilaterally at any time by the municipal authority's decision the developer/investor
cannot control the costs which comprise the amount of the urban land servicing fee. This
implies that an investment project which is profitable according to the current fee level,
can become unprofitable according to sorne future fee level, EvidentIy such an arrange-
ment discourages property investment.?
Moreover, such arrangements for urban land allocation imply that municipal authorities
are empowered to withdraw the right to use a location at any time, meaning that the actual
user can be evicted from the location at any time. This increases the uncertainty for poten-
tial users/investors which discourages property investment. On the other hand, a lower
level of investment diminishes the potential for economic restructuring which leads to per-
petuating the inefficient economic structure of cities.
As there is a monopoly of public urban landowership, it is not possible for potential
urban land investors to invest vast financial resources. This is why significant potential
investors such as pension funds, insurance companies and other financial institutions can-
not invest in land and real property, thus inducing a decline in property investment. Fur-
thermore, the nonexistence of an urban land market accounts for the nonexistence of nu-
merous financial mechanisms that are cornmon in free market systems (mortgage loans,
property bonds, property companies' shares, etc). Accordingly, the concentration of fi-
nancial capital for funding real property investments has been slow and inefficient, Le.
capital is not mobile. This has resulted in a constant shortage of financial resources which
in turn reduces property investment activities.
The current urban land use system (as well as the legal system) is rather vague and is
inconsistent with the urban land use system in market economies. Hence, potential foreign
property investors are amply discouraged to invest. This accounts for a further reduction
in property investment and a further delay in the internationalization of the economy.
Thus, it is evident that the current urban land use system in Belgrade shows a very poor
performance in the domainof economic efficiency.
Furthermore, the nonmarket urban land use system has resulted in the poor performan-
ce of the municipal and local authorities' financing. As the system is nonmarket there are •
no urban land market prices or market rents. It is reasonable to expect that market prices
and rents would be much higher than the current urban land donation and urban land use
fees. Hence, if there were an urban land market prices, municipal and local au-
thority revenues from urban land sales and rents would be much higher.
As there is monopoly of public urban landownership there is no solidbasis for urban
land taxation. One could reasonably assume that municipal and local authority revenues
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from the taxation of privately owned urban land would be considerable. Hence, the mono-
poly of public urban landownership and the nonexistence of an urban land market and market
prices leads to a poor performance in the realm of the municipal and local authorities'
financing, as revenues are considerably smaller than what they could be potentially.
In addition, the municipal authorities' financing policy has induced a further reduction
in local revenues. FirstIy, fees have not been properly indexed to the high inflation rates.
For example, during 1987 the average monthIy fee indexation was 3%, while the average
monthly inflation rate was 10%, in real terms, revenues were significantIy reduced. Mo-
reover, as there were no constrains, urban land users/occupants were encouraged to post-
pone payment the urban land use fee. This was a component of the policy aimed at decrea-
sing the tax burden of the enterprises and tho help them in the troublesome times of economic
crisis.
An «informal» practice existed of writing off the debts of socially owned firms where
the urban land fees were concerned. This actually meant that these firms evaded fee pay-
ments. Such a policy was applied very frequentIy in the case ofbig lossmakers which usua11y
employ a huge labor force." All these elements have led to a further reduction in munici-
pal and local revenues. Very frequentIy this reduction is so vast that the revenues are not
sufficient to finance land servicing and provide public urban utilities. These deficits are
dealt with by borrowing money from clearing (commercial) banks.
5. The effects of the nonmarket urban land use system on urban
development
Urban development in Belgrade is affected in sorne cases directIy, but in many more,
indirectIy as the result ofthe nonmarket urban land use system. One ofthe most important
effects is that there is no conventional central business district in Belgrade. This is due
to the negligible urban land use fee. It has already been pointed out that such afee level
has persistentIy encouraged the physically and economically inefficient use of urban land.
Thus low density housing still exist in the very center of Belgrade. As there is no incentive
for tenants to relocate (due to negligible housing costs) it is not possible for .business (offi-
ce space, retail, etc.) to be highIy concentrated in the very center of Belgrade. Hence, the
process of urban redevelopment is strongly discouraged.
As it has been pointed out, the urban land donation fee and the urban land use fee are
virtually identical for alllocations. However, the urban land servicing fee equals the actual
land servicing costs at a given location. Hence in the case of redevelopment all the costs
of clearing the location should be paid by the investor/developer. These costs are high be-
cause appropriate accornmodation (new houses or flats) must be provided for all the te-
nants located in the building due for demolition. Furthermore, the whole operation of de-
molition, clearing the site and finding appropriate accornmodation for tenants is exclusively
carried out by the municipal authority, so there can be no cost control by the investor.
Therefore, potential investors are discouraged to invest in redevelopment.
These obstacles to redevelopment have resulted in the concentration of development on
the urban fringes and so Belgrade's urban development tends towards an urban spraw1.
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Such a pattern of urban development has brought on a reduction in global urban densities,
which in tum require investment in long urban infrastructure lines (roads, pipelines, etc).
Furthermore, the reduction in global densities gives rise to the need for various urban uti-
lities (public transportation, etc). Such a pattern of investment has reduced the economic
efficiency in providing all urban utilities.
An additional factor in such a tendency towards urban sprawl is a persistent excess de-
mand for housing and office space. This excess demand is also one of the results of the
actual nonmarket urban land use system. Namely, one may say it is reasonable to expect
that market land rent would be much higher than the urba~ land use fee.
This means that the cost of living has been significantly reduced. According to the re-
sults of a theoretical consideration of internal migrations,? these costs are a significant ge-
nerator of migrations. The lower the cost of living in a given city, the larger the population
migration will be towards that city. Hence the low cost of living in Belgrade .índuced by
the nonmarket system have significantly influenced a large migrational flow toward Bel-
grade. Such a flow has created a high growth rate of Belgrade's urban population, hence
the excess demand for housing and office space.
6. Conclusion
The nonmarket urban land use system in Belgrade derives from the socialist nonmarket
economic system. The essence of such a system is the monopoly of public ownership over
assets and resources, and the administrative (nonmarket) allocation of these resources.
The institutions and mechanisms of the nonmarket urban land use system are very dis-
tinctive from the institutions of a market system. They correspond to administrative allo-
cation and are based on the discriminatory rights of the municipal and local authorities.
There are no market prices or rents, rather unilaterally determined urban land fees.
The economic effects of such a system are very poor. The crucial effect is the physically
and economically inefficient use of urban land. Such inefficiency has a significant impact
on the general economic inefficiency of a socialist economy. Additionally, the nonmarket
system has caused a significant reduction.in real property investment as well as in global
investment activity. This leads to a deterioration of the prospects for economic restructu-
ring, particularly with respect to industries located in cities. The financial performance
of this system is also poor, as there is a perpetual deficit in the municipal budget.
The nonmarket urban land use system has had adverse consequences on urban develop-
ment in Belgrade: urban development has a strong tendency towards urban sprawl and ur-
ban redevelopment is neglected, which implies a further reduction in the urban land use
eficiency. A proper central business district has not been established. Due to the relatively
low cost of living, a huge immigration has taken place, which has in turn activated a high
population growth rate, which led to the deterioration of the quality of life.
. The overall performance of the nonmarket urban land use system in Belgrade has there-
fore been evaluated as very poor. This is the result of the essence of the current urban
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land use system: the monopoly of the public urban landownership and administrative (non-
market) allocation ofthe land. That is why such a system cannot be successfully modified.
It should be replaced by a market urban land use system.
Notes
1 A fruitful analysis of the Yugoslav economic system, its origin and its distinctions compared to the Soviet
system has been given by Prout (1985).
2 This is consistent with the premises of communist ideology (based on Marx's value theory) that only revenues
based on the employment of labor are socially justified.
3 See Madzar (1990) and Milanovié (1991) for the discussion.
4 According to the Urban Land Nationalization Act, although nationalization of the vast majority of property
rights was done by a Federal decree in 1945.
5 It can be argued that fee is essentially rento However, it should be taken into account that no free will of users
has been revealed, no contract has been established, no rent revision procedure has been agreed upon. Accor-
dingly, this fee cannot be labeled rento
6 For the empirical evidence which support this thesis in the case of Yugoslavia see Begovié (1991a).
7 It can be argued that cyclical tendencies on the real property markets in Westem countries have the same ef-
fects. However, it should be pointed out that market price fluctuations can be predicted, at least in principal,
while the behavior of the state is rather unpredictable.
8 This is consistent with the job preservation policy, very popular in all communist countries.
9 For a good review of these considerations see Greenwood (1985).
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